Abstract: We consider a processor-sharing service station which serves all its customers simultaneously, with the service rate to individual customers decreasing as the load increases. Each arriving customer observes the current load, and may then choose to join the shared system or use an alternative service option { modeled here as a private server (e.g., a personal computer, as an alternative to a central mainframe computer). Customers make individual decisions, and each wishes to minimize her own service time. However, the optimal decision for each customer depends on the choices of subsequent ones, since these a ect the future load on the shared server. This decision problem is analyzed as a non-cooperative dynamic game between all customers. We rst show that any Nash equilibrium point consists of threshold decision rules, and establish the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium point. Computation of the equilibrium threshold is demonstrated for the case of Poisson arrivals, and some of its properties are delineated. We next turn attention to a plausible dynamic learning scheme, where arriving customers employ a simple decision rule solely based on observed performance history in the shared system. Convergence to the symmetric equilibrium point is established, thereby underscoring the relevance of the Nash equilibrium solution for this system. Subject classi cation: Queues, optimization: processor sharing. Games/group decisions, stochastic: games in queues. 1 This paper is a revised and extended version of the report \Individually optimal dynamic routing in a processor sharing system: stochastic game analysis".
Introduction
The quality of service experienced by an individual user in a shared service system often depends on the current load. Thus, in order to estimate her expected service quality, a user must consider not only the current load at her arrival instant, but also how this load might develop throughout her service period. We study in this paper the implications for self-optimizing users, who may choose between joining the shared system, or use alternative service. The model that we consider is motivated by the following scenario.
Potential computer users, each requiring the use of a computer to execute a given job, arrive sequentially at a computer facility. Each user, upon arrival, may choose between the following two options: either to connect to a central mainframe computer (MF), which is normally serving many users in parallel; or to use a personal computer (PC). Service on either computer commences immediately, so that the total sojourn time coincides with the service time. Each user is solely interested in minimizing her own service time.
Service at the MF computer is performed according to the Processor Sharing discipline (e.g., Jaiswal (1982) , Ramaswami (1984) ), where available computing power is equally divided among all users present. Consequently, the service rate to each user decreases as the load increases (although the total service rate may actually increase). The current load, namely the number of users in MF, may be observed by each arriving user. However, in order to evaluate her expected service time at MF, the arriving user must take into account the load on this computer throughout her service time. This load, in turn, is a ected by the decisions of subsequent users who may or may not join MF. Therefore, in order to reach an optimal decision for herself, each user must make some assumptions on the decisions of others, which are themselves independent decision makers confronted with a similar problem. This leads to consider the resulting decision problem in a game theoretic framework, and explore the Nash equilibrium solution for the resulting dynamic game.
Although we nd it convenient to refer to this PC/mainframe application, it is by no means the only one to which our model is relevant. We mention here two other relevant applications in the area of telecommunications.
(i) Consider a situation where users can communicate with each other either through a Local Area Network (LAN), or through the public network, e.g., by connecting to the telephone network via a modem. Communication using the modem could be quite slower than through the Local Area Network. However, the throughput available to each user on the Local Area Network decreases as the total workload increases. This is especially the case in LANs where a single channel should be shared between all users, e.g. the F.D.D.I. (Fiber Distributed Data Interface). The LAN can thus be approximated by a processor sharing queue, whereas the public network may be viewed as assigning a private server to each session.
(ii) Consider a non real time application, such as data transfer, on an ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) network (see ATM Forum (1996) ). ATM networks support both guaranteed services as well as best-e ort services. The guaranteed services are CBR (Constant Bit Rate), in which a xed amount of bandwidth is assigned to a session, and the VBR (Variable Bit Rate) in which some average and some peak bit-rates are assigned to a session. The best e ort services are ABR (Available Bit Rate) and the UBR (Unspeci ed Bit Rate); in both cases, some available bandwidth is shared among the connections that use these services. At a session level, the ABR and UBR services can be approximated by a processor sharing queue, where as the CBR and VBR services can be approximated by a single server, dedicated for one session.
Our study concentrates on two main themes. In the rst part, we explore the properties of the Nash equilibrium solution. The main results here are the existence, uniqueness, and structural characterization of a symmetric equilibrium policy. The required analysis of the processor sharing queue relies on stochastic coupling arguments, rather than explicit calculations, which facilitates the consideration of both general inter-arrival times and of state-dependent total service rates.
The second issue concerns the descriptive power of the Nash equilibrium solution. The question arises as to what extent does the Nash equilibrium actually describe the system operation under realistic conditions, and what is the mechanism that might lead to this equilibrium. We consider a dynamic learning scenario, where users make simple decisions based on past performance statistics. Since the observed statistics depend on past decisions, this leads to a closed-loop adaptive decision problem. It is established that the emerging decision rule for each user, and consequently the system operating characteristics, converge to the Nash equilibrium point. The analysis here uses the theory of Stochastic Approximations with controlled Markov state.
Dynamic control of queueing systems has been the subject of considerable research, see the surveys in Stidham (1985) , Walrand (1988) . Social optimization results for a Processor Sharing queue may be found in de Waal (1988) . Individual optimality has been studied and compared to social optimality in various dynamic control models, under the rst-come-rstserved (FCFS) service discipline; see Naor (1969) , Yechiali (1972) , Bell and Stidham (1983) , Bartoli and Stidham (1990) and Stidham (1985) for further references. Since under a FCFS discipline the expected sojourn time of any single customer is completely determined by the queue length at her arrival, the decision policy is trivial in that case.
There has been some work on the Nash equilibrium concept for the study of individually optimal dynamic control of queueing systems, see Glazer and Hassin (1986) , Hassin and Haviv (1994) . Game theoretical analysis has been applied to other queueing control problems, e.g., Bovopoulos and Lazar (1987) , Courcoubetis and Varaiya (1983) , Kulkarni (1983) , Lee and Cohen (1985) , Shenker (1990) , Hsiao and Lazar (1991) , Altman (1992) , Altman and Hordijk (1995) , Altman and Koole (1992) , Altman and Shimkin (1993) , , where the last six consider dynamic problems. Finally, results related to our work have been obtained in Haviv (1991) and in Xu and Shantikumar (1993) .
The organization of the paper is as follows. The model is presented in Section 1. In Section 2 the Nash equilibrium is studied, assuming i.i.d. inter-arrival times, possibly state-dependent service rate, and exponential service requirements. It is shown that in any equilibrium point, the decision rule of each user is a threshold rule. Existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium point are then established, using certain monotonicity and continuity properties of the service time at MF. The proofs of these results are established in the Appendix using stochastic-coupling arguments. Section 3 concerns the actual calculation of the symmetric equilibrium. Formulas are derived for the case of Poisson arrivals, and are illustrated by numerical examples. In Section 4 the (individually optimal) Nash solution is compared with the socially optimal one. Section 5 presents the proposed dynamic learning scheme, and establishes its convergence to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. We close with some concluding 4 remarks in Section 6.
The Model
Consider a service system which consists of two service facilities, Q MF and Q PC . Customers (users) arrive at this system sequentially, with inter-arrival times which are independent and identically distributed, and have nite nite mean ?1 . Simultaneous arrivals are excluded. Each arriving customer observes the number of customers in Q MF at her arrival instant, and should choose whether to join Q MF or Q PC .
We assume that Q MF has a bu er size B, which may be nite or in nite. A customer that arrives when the bu er is full cannot be admitted and must use Q PC .
The service at Q MF is exponential with rate (x), where x 1 is the number of customers in Q MF . The service discipline is Processor Sharing, so that the service intensity for each customer equals (x) 4 = (x)=x. The alternative Q PC o ers a xed expected service time ?1 . In both queues service commences immediately upon admission, so that the sojourn time coincides with the service time.
We make the following assumptions on the service rate at Q MF :
(i) 0 < (x) max for every x 1 (bounded service rate);
(ii) (x) = (x)=x is strictly decreasing in x 1. Thus, as the load increases, the service rate to each customer decreases.
Let X(t) denote the number of customers in Q MF at time t. Assume that the system starts at t = 0 with initial state X(0) = x 0 , . Let T k ; k 0, denote the arrival time of customer C k , where 0 = T 0 < T 1 < T 2 < : : :, so that t = 0 coincides with the arrival time of the rst customer C 0 .
Let X(t) denote the number of customers at Q MF at time t, and suppose that the system starts at t = 0 with initial state X(0) = x 0 . Let T k ; k 0, denote the arrival time of customer C k , where 0 = T 0 < T 1 < T 2 < : : :. Hence T 0 = 0 is the arrival time of customer C 0 .
Customer C k must decide which queue to join at time T k , after observing X(T k ) { the queue length just prior to her arrival. A randomized decision rule for customer C k is therefore 5 de ned as u k = fu k (x); 0 x < Bg, where u k (x) 2 0; 1] is the probability of joining Q MF if a queue length X(T k ) = x is observed. Let U denote the collection of such decision rules, and let = (u 0 ; u 1 ; : : :) 2 4 = U 1 denote the vector of decision rules of all the customers, which we term a policy.
Denote by w k the service duration of customer C k , and let W k (x; ) be the expected value of w k given that x customers are present at Q MF upon arrival of C k , and all customers (including C k ) follow the policy 2 . Then
where V k (x; ) is the expected service duration of C k at Q MF under the same conditions. We observe that V k depends on through fu l ; l > kg, the decision rules of subsequent customers.
We assume an individual decision structure, where each customer wishes to minimize her own service time. To this end, she should obviously evaluate her expected service time at the two queues, namely V k (x; ) and ?1 , and choose the lower one.
The dependence of V k on the decisions of other users leads us to study this problem within a game theoretic framework.
Nash Equilibrium Solution
We now consider the system as a non-cooperative game, in which each customer wishes to minimize her own expected service time. The main results of this section concern the characterization of the equilibrium points of this game.
For each policy = (u 0 ; u 1 ; : : :), let ?k denote the collection of all decision rules in excluding the rule u k of C k , and let ?k j u 0 k ] be the policy which results when u k is replaced by u 0 k .
De nition 1 A decision rule u k of C k is said to be optimal against the policy ?k if
De nition 2 A policy = (u 0 ; u 1 ; : : :) is a Nash equilibrium policy if, for every k 0, u k is optimal against ?k .
Thus, in equilibrium the decision rule of each customer is optimal given the decision rules of the others. Since the queue length x is observed prior to decision, we require that to hold for all possible values of the x.
In the sequel we shall take special interest in equilibrium policies which are symmetric, namely the decision rules of all customers are identical. Such policies are natural here, since the speci cations of all customers are the same, and they all face the same decision problem. (In the terminology of Schelling (1960) , symmetric equilibria are the natural candidates for the focal equilibrium of the game.)
We de ne next a special class of decision rules, namely threshold rules. For any 0 q 1 and integer L 0, the decision rule u is an L; q]-threshold rule if
A customer which employs this rule joins Q MF if the queue length x is smaller than L, while if x = L she does so with probability q. Otherwise Having established the basic de nitions and notations, we now turn to the main results of this section.
Theorem 1 (i) For any equilibrium policy = (u 0 ; u 1 ; : : :), each decision rule u k is a threshold rule.
(ii) A symmetric equilibrium policy = (u ; u ; : : :) exists, is unique, and u is a threshold rule.
The proof proceeds through some lemmas. The rst two establish basic monotonicity and continuity properties of the service time in Q MF . Related monotonicity results for a Processor-Sharing queue may be found in de Waal and Van Dijk (1988) .
Recall that V k (x; ) denotes the expected service time at Q MF .
Lemma 1 For every policy and k 0, V k (x; ) is strictly increasing in x. In fact, V k (x + 1; ) ? V k (x; ) > for some positive , independent of . Proof: A detailed proof, based on stochastic coupling arguments, is given in the Appendix.
The idea is simple. Consider two cases, the rst when a customer (say C 0 ) enters at queue length x, and the second when she enters at x + 1. Since the queue lengths change by at most one customer at a time, the queue length in the second case will be higher than in the rst one, until such a time (possibly in nite) when they coincide. From then on the queue lengths will remains equal, since the decision policies for incoming customers are the same in both cases. It then follows that the service rate to C 0 throughout her stay is higher in the rst case than in the second, and strictly so up until , which imply a lower expected service time. Proof: The proof, again using stochastic coupling arguments, is presented in the Appendix.
In fact, we show that V k (x; g] 1 ) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous (on compact subsets, hence, in particular, in the nite bu er case) { a property that will be required in Section 5.
Lemma 3 Let be an arbitrary policy, and let U k be the set of decision rules for C k which are optimal against ?k .
(i) Any u k 2 U k is a threshold rule, with nite threshold, and is given by:
where 0 q x 1 is arbitrary. (Recall that ?1 is the expected service time in Q PC .)
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(ii) Consequently, the set U k is given as follows. Let L be the smallest non-negative in-
Otherwise, U k consists of the single threshold rule L ; 0]. Proof: Assume that C k observes x customers in Q MF at her arrival. She should now choose to join either Q MF , where her expected service time would be V k (x; ), or Q PC , where her expected service time is ?1 . Obviously, the optimal decision is to choose the lower one, and is thus given by (3). By Lemma 1, V k (x; ) is strictly increasing in x, so that (3) is indeed a threshold rule. Finiteness of the threshold should be checked for B = 1; it follows from the easily veri ed fact that V k (x; ) ! 1 as x ! 1. Thus (i) is established, and (ii) follows immediately from (i) after noting again that V k (x; ) is increasing in x.
Proof of Theorem 1:
(i) Let = (u 0 ; u 1 ; : : :) be an equilibrium policy. By De nition 2 each u k must be optimal against , and from Lemma 3 it follows that u k is a threshold rule.
(ii) By (i), a symmetric equilibrium policy must consist of identical threshold policies, i.e.
= g] 1 for some g 2 0; B]. It remains to establish existence and uniqueness of a threshold g 2 0; B] such that g ] is optimal for C 0 (hence for any C k ) against g ] 1 .
De ne the point-to-set mapping G 
Thus, it is required to prove that G possesses a unique xed point, i.e., a unique g 2 0; B] such that g 2 G (g ). In essence, the required existence and uniqueness follow, respectively, from continuity and monotonicity properties of G . (In fact, existence may be deduced by applying the Kakutani xed point theorem (see Ba sar and Olsder (1982) p. 409), which is commonly used to establish existence of Nash equilibria. However, it will be more instructive to construct explicitly the graph of G .) By Lemma 3(ii), the set G (g) can be expressed as follows. Let`(g) denote the minimal integer L 0 for which V 0 (L; g] 1 ) ?1 (note that`(g) is nite since V 0 (x; g] 1 ) ! 1 as
We next argue that the graph of G (g) has the \staircase" form depicted in Figure 1 . Recall from Lemmas 1 and 2 that V 0 (x; g] 1 ) is strictly increasing in x and g, and is continuous in g.
This implies that, as g increases from 0 to B, the map g !`(g) is non-increasing, piecewise constant, left continuous, and its downward jumps are of exactly one unit. Let J 0 be the number of jumps of`( ), and, provided J 1, let 0 < g 1 < < g J be the jump points of`( ). By the above-mentioned properties of V 0 (x; g] 1 ) it also follows that V 0 (`(g j ); g j ] 1 ) = ?1 at each jump point g j . De ning for notational convenience g 0 = 0 and g J+1 = 1,`( ) is given by: (g) =`(0) ? j for g j < g g j+1 , j = 0; : : : ; J : It then follows from (5) that (see Figure 1 ) Remark: It is interesting that the equilibrium threshold g can be either an integer or a noninteger (corresponding to a deterministic or a randomized equilibrium policy), with neither case being generic. This observation, which is clearly evident in Figure 5 , may be understood from Figure 1 , where the line of unit slope may intersect the graph of G (g) in its horizontal (integer) or vertical (non-integer) part.
Remark: It is easy to show that if for a given bu er size B of Q MF we obtain g < B, then g will be unchanged for any B 0 > B.
We close this section by mentioning some interesting generalizations, to which the above results apply as well.
Characterization
The following procedure may be used to compute the equilibrium threshold, which corresponds to the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of our model. 
Proof: Case (a) is straightforward, and follows from Lemma 3 (ii). As for (b), note rst that L is well de ned even for the case B = 1, since lim L!1 V (L; L; 1] 1 ) = 1 (as may be easily veri ed). To show that q is well de ned, we need to verify that equation (7) 
Some Explicit Calculations
We now specialize our discussion to the case of Poisson arrivals, and constant total service rate at Q PC ( (x) ). For this case we determine the the service times V (L; L; q] 1 ), andobtain the solution q of equation (7).
Let L,q] be xed. Then V (x) := V (x; L; q] 1 ) ; 0 x L, is the solution of the following set of L + 1 linear equations:
where = + . These equations express that the service time of a customer, if there are x customers (excluding herself) in the queue, is equal to the time till the next transition, (e.g. ?1 in the rst equation), plus the expected remaining service time from the next transition. They may obviously be solved for each given L,q]; however, in order to obtain the optimal threshold we derive a more explicit solution. By (8), V (x) can be represented by
where the coe cients a(x) and b(x) are obtained recursively by substituting (11) (11), we obtain after some algebraic manipulation
V (x) may now be obtained from (11){(13). We may now calculate the equilibrium threshold. We rst compute L by Lemma 4. If we are in case (a) or (b1) of Lemma 4 then q = 0. Otherwise, in case (b2), we compute 0 < q < 1 as the unique solution of (7). Using (10), (11) and (14) to express V (L ; L ; q] 1 ) 13 as a function of q, rearranging and canceling terms we obtain a linear equation for q , whose solution is 
A Numeric Example
We illustrate these results and some properties of the computed quantities through a numerical example. We consider the parameters B = 1, = 10 and = 100. 
there will always be L customers in Q MF , and therefore the expected service time is (just below) ( =L) ?1 . Comparing with ?1 , the individually optimal threshold will be (just above) L = ?1 . Figure 5 also compares the equilibrium threshold to the the socially optimal one. This will be discussed in the following Section.
4 Social, Individual, and Na ve Optimality Depending on the identity and characteristics of the decision makers in the system, di erent solution concepts may be appropriate under di erent circumstances. Here we compare the Nash equilibrium with the socially optimal threshold policy, and also touch upon individual optimality under simpli ed (na ve) assumptions.
In the socially optimal control problem the goal is to minimize the expected average sojourn time per customer. A user does not seek to minimize her own sojourn time, but rather takes into consideration the e ect of her action on all users (the externality cost).
For the social optimality criterion, we note that the expected average sojourn time is the same if the PS discipline is changed to First Come First Served (FCFS). This problem is known to possess an optimal non-randomized threshold policy (see e.g. Stidham (1985) ). Let L so be the value of this threshold; jobs should be admitted to Q MF if and only if there are less than L so jobs in there.
We observe that L so is not larger than the Nash equilibrium threshold. This is a direct consequence of the existence of externality costs in Q MF and their absence in Q PC , and can be seen by contradiction; suppose L so were larger than the equilibrium threshold. Then any customer arriving to Q MF under the socially optimal regime that would not arrive under the Nash individual regime, not only has her own expected sojourn time increased, but also causes future jobs to have longer expected sojourn times, since the Q MF has to share its capacity between jobs.
Let us calculate L so for the case of Poisson arrivals and state-independent service rate . Suppose that the threshold L; 0] is used. Denoting = = , and using standard results for nite-bu er queues (as in Naor (1969) ), the expected sojourn time in the system is given by
L so is obtained as the integer that minimizes E W L ]. As discussed above, it is seen from Figure 5 that the threshold for the socially optimal threshold is indeed lower than the Nash equilibrium threshold. The threshold L so decreases as (and thus ) grows, and it reaches asymptotically L so = 1; our calculations show that L so = 1 for 815. We already saw that as grows, the Nash equilibrium threshold tends to 10; 0], i.e. 10 times higher than the socially optimal threshold. The expected sojourn time in Q MF is thus 10 times higher when the individual (equilibrium) criterion is used. It is obvious that individual users will have a strong incentive to deviate from the socially optimal policy in this case.
Finally, it should be of interest to consider the case of na ve individual optimality. Here we have self-optimizing customers, which make the simplifying assumption that the load they perceive at their arrival will not change throughout their service period. While false in general, this assumption may often be adopted in practice. Thus, a customer which sees x customers in Q PC assumes that his expected sojourn time there will be (x + 1)=(x + 1), and compares this time to ?1 . (Observe that for state-independent , this coincides with the case of a simple FCFS queue.) The resulting threshold is independent of the arrival rate . which indicates its de ciency for the processor sharing problem. In our example we obtain L = = = 10. It is not hard to verify that the na ve individual threshold will be lower than the individually-optimal equilibrium threshold (as long as (x) is non-decreasing in x, and there are no uncontrolled arrivals to Q PC ). This follows since for a customer who enters just below the threshold, the assumption that the queue length will not change is the worst possible one.
Learning and Equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium solution is de ned from a normative viewpoint. It sets the \rational" choice for a sophisticated decision maker, who has global information about the system and can reason about the choices of others.
This section examines the relevance of the Nash equilibrium solution derived above, from a di erent, descriptive, viewpoint. We demonstrate that it naturally emerges in a dynamic learning scenario, which is a reasonable one for the system at hand. In the scenario considered here, customers base their decisions on statistical data which are accumulated by the server. No prior information is assumed regarding service in or arrivals to Q MF , nor do customers employ game-theoretic considerations to make their decisions.
Other dynamic schemes which converge to the Nash equilibrium have been considered in the literature, mostly within the scenario that each decision maker (out of a nite number) is unilaterally and repeatedly trying to improve its position. See, e.g., Li and Ba sar (1987) , Hsiao and Lazar (1991) , Rosen (1965) , Lakshmivarahan (1981) , Kalai and Lehrer (1993) .
The Learning Model
We consider the system of Section 1, and assume that the server monitors the average sojourn times of customers in Q MF , depending on the queue length at their arrival instants. Newly arriving customers have access to this accumulated data, in addition to the queue length at their arrival, and may use it to estimate their performance at Q MF before deciding which queue to join.
The system starts at time 0 without any prior data or operating statistics regarding Q MF . For every t 0, let N t (x) denote the number of customers who had joined Q MF at queue length x and already left it by time t. LetV t (x) denote the (empirical) average service time of these N t (x) customers. A customer who arrives at time t may inspect the current vector V t .
Consider then a customer who arrives at time t, observes X t customers in Q MF , and has to choose between Q MF and Q PC . A natural decision rule for a customer who seeks to minimize her service time is: join Q MF ifV t (X t ) < ?1 , and join Q PC otherwise.
It is our purpose to show that this learning decision rule, with some modi cations that will be introduced below, converges to the one implied by the Nash equilibrium solution, as do the other performance measures such as average waiting times, number of customers in the queues, etc. We introduce the following extensions to the model:
1. Uncontrolled arrivals: We assume that a nonzero fraction of the arrivals are uncontrolled, in the sense that they always join Q MF . Uncontrolled arrivals, discussed at the end of Section 2, are a natural extension of the basic model; their importance for the proper convergence of the learning process is outlined below. The remaining arrivals are controlled, and may choose to join Q MF or Q PC as before.
Speci cally, we assume that each arrival has a probability p u > 0 of being uncontrolled, independently of other arrivals. The resulting arrival rates for controlled and uncontrolled arrivals are then u = p u and c = (1 ? p u ) , respectively.
The existence of uncontrolled arrivals ensures that learning will not stop. If the measured statistics at a given time indicates that entering Q MF at some queue length x is unfavorable, further arrivals at this queue size may halt, and this (possibly misleading) information will not be updated. Uncontrolled arrivals ensure that arrivals to Q MF will continue at every possible queue size. (17) is completely deterministic { it prescribes a single choice based on the di erences between the (estimated) waiting times in the two queues. It stands to reason that if this di erence is small, some other factors may in uence the actual decision. We model these factors by possibly randomized decisions, and consider the following decision rule in place of (17):
Randomized decisions: The decision rule
join Q MF with probability S ( ?1 ?V t (X t )) ;
where is a small positive parameter, and S is an increasing function, with S (x) = 0 for x ? , and S (x) = 1 for x . More speci cally, let S (x) = S(x= ), where S is a monotone increasing, Lipschitz-continuous (i.e., with bounded slope) function, with S(x) = 0 for x ?1, and S(x) = 1 for x 1.
Besides being plausible, the inclusion of randomized decisions facilitates a direct correspondence between the learning algorithm and the Nash equilibrium solution, in case that the latter is randomized. The deterministic decision rule (17) would then give rise to more complicated behavior, whereby a randomized threshold can best be approximated by time switching between two deterministic ones.
We further assume that the bu er of the Q MF is nite, i.e. B < 1.
It is easily veri ed that the results of Section 2 (including the lemmas and main theorem) remain valid in the case of additional uncontrolled arrivals. The value of the equilibrium threshold, which we shall denote be g , will of course be a ected (it should decrease with the fraction p u of uncontrolled arrivals and with the size of the bu er B of Q MF ).
Convergence
We now examine the asymptotic behavior of this dynamic learning process, and establish its convergence to the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2 Letû t denote the decision rule implied by (18) at time t, namelŷ u t (x) = S ( ?1 ?V t (x)) : (19) (a)û t converges (almost surely) to a decision rule u which, for all small enough, is a threshold rule.
(b) For ! 0, the limiting decision rule u converges to the Nash equilibrium policy g ].
An immediate consequence of this result is that, for small enough, the long-term performance of the learning system coincides with the expected performance under the (stationary) Nash equilibrium policy. This pertains both to individual performance measures, namely the individual service times, and to system-oriented performance measure, such as the average load, server utilization, and arrival statistics in the di erent queues.
For the proof we shall rely on the theory of the Stochastic Approximation algorithm, and in particular the ODE (Ordinary Di erential Equation) method for convergence analysis (Kushner and Clark (1978) , Benveniste, Metevier and Prioret (1982) ).
We rst establish ideas and notation. Let T m (x) be the m-th update time ofV t (x), which is the time of the m-th departure from Q MF of a customer who entered at queue size x, and let w m (x) be the service time of that customer. 
Our update law forV slightly defers from the standard Stochastic Approximation algorithm, in that the di erent entries of this vector are updated asynchronously. This issue will be addressed in Lemmas 7 and 8 below.
The following analysis is based on representing the dynamics of the system as a controlled Markov process. We proceed to identify this process, de ne more precisely the relevant ODE, investigate its equilibrium properties and their relation to the Nash equilibrium of the system, and establish the convergence of the learning process.
We rst de ne w (v; ) more carefully. Let v be some possible value of the vectorV t , and let u (v) denote the decision rule derived from v through (19), namely, u (v; x) = S ( ?1 ? v(x)) ; 0 x < B : (23) Consider the system operated with this stationary decision policies, applied by all controlled customers; this corresponds to freezingV t in (19) at the xed value v. Noting the nite bu er assumption and the existence of uncontrolled arrivals, it follows immediately that the queue process in Q MF is a recurrent, nite state Markov chain, with a unique stationary distribution. 21
Then w (v; x) denotes the expected waiting time, under this stationary distribution, of a customer which enters Q MF at queue size x. The following lemmas are valid for all > 0 small enough.
Lemma 5 Consider the stationary points of the di erential equation (22), namely the solutions of w (v) ? v = 0.
(i) There exists a unique solution, denoted v .
(ii) The decision rule u (x) = S ( ?1 ? v (x)), x 0, corresponding to that solution is a threshold rule .
(iii) As ! 0, the decision rule u converges to the Nash equilibrium policy g ].
Proof: As just observed, the vector v determines w (v) through the decision rule u (v) . We rst show that at any candidate stationary point v, u (v) is a threshold rule. In terms of the notation of Section 2, we have w (v; x) = V 0 (x; (v)), where (v) is the stationary policy corresponding to the decision rule u (v) . It follows from Lemma 1 that w (v; x) is increasing in x. In fact, it follows from the proof of this lemma that there exists a constant , independent Existence and uniqueness of such a threshold may be established in a similar way to the proof of Theorem 1. That is, we rst de ne a map G (g), which assigns to every threshold g another threshold G (g), by using (b) and (a) successively. It follows that g ! G (g) is continuous and decreasing in g, hence has a unique xed point, say g . The corresponding vector v is then the unique solution of v = w (v), and g ] = u .
It remains to show that g converges to the Nash threshold g . This follows by noting, using the de nition of S , that lim !0 G (g) 2 G (g), where G (g) is the point-to-set mapping de ned in the proof of Theorem 1 (compare (5) with (23)). It follows that the xed point of g ! G (g) (corresponding to g ) must converge to the xed point of g ! G (g) (which corresponds to g ).
Lemma 6 The stationary point v of (22) is globally exponentially stable; that is, lim t!1 v t = v for all initial conditions v 0 , with an exponential convergence rate.
Proof: Let > 0 be as in the proof of the previous lemma, and again assume < =2. We rst show that, after some nite time t 0 , we have v t (x+1) > v t (x)+2 for all x. De ne v t (x) = v t (x+1)?v t (x), and w t (x) = w (v t ; x+1)?w (v t ; x). From (22), d dt v t (x) = w t (x)? v t (x). Recalling that w t (x) > by de nition of , this di erential relation implies that v t (x) > 2 is reached within a nite time, which may be bounded by (2 ? v 0 (x))=( ? 2 ).
It follows that for all t > t 0 , u (v t ) will be a threshold rule. Let g t denote the corresponding threshold, and assume t > t 0 hereafter.
As 
where we have used the equilibrium relation v = w (v ) . This implies that L t converges to 0 at rate e ?2t , hence that v t (x o ) converges to v (x o ) at rate e ?t . 23
Recalling that g = x o ? 1 + S ( ?1 ? v (x o )), it follows by continuity arguments that g t converges exponentially to g . This, in turn, implies the exponential convergence of w (v t ) to v = w (v ) . It then easily follows from (21), considering the equation for every x independently, that v t converges (exponentially) to v .
The following lemma introduces a modi ed version of the di erential equation (22), which accounts for the asynchronous updates of the components of the estimated vector. 
Then the results of the previous two lemmas hold here as well. In particular, v , appended by = r(v ), is a globally exponentially stable equilibrium point for these equations.
Proof: Since t remains positive by its equation, the stationary points of v t must coincide with those of (22), and the stationary value for follows trivially. Regarding stability, we note that after a nite time we obtain t (x) 2 =2; 1], so that the ratio r t (x)= t (x) is bounded in
; 2= ]. This factor may then be viewed as a bounded time normalization of the equations for v t , and the proof of the previous lemma applies here with minor modi cations.
Lemma 8V t converges (a.s.) to v . Proof: Observe thatV t may change only at times fT n g, where T n is the time of the n-th departure from Q MF . Let V n denote the value ofV t at (just after) T n . In order to write the update equation for V n , de ne W n { the sojourn time of the customer that left at T n , N n (x) { the number of departures up to T n which entered at queue length x, and I n (x) { the indicator of the event that the customer which left at T n entered at queue size x. Obviously, N n = P n k=1 I n . In this notation, V n (x) = V n?1 (x) + 1 N n (x) I n (x)(W n ? V n?1 (x)) :
We would like to put that equation in the standard form of Stochastic Approximations, where the vanishing gain sequence is the same for all components of V n . This may be done by 24 introducing the auxiliary variables n (x) = N n (x)=n. Then V n (x) = V n?1 + 1 n I n (x) n (x) (W n ? V n?1 (x)) ; (25) and n (x) = n?1 (x) + 1 n (I n (x) ? n?1 (x)) :
We proceed to establish that (V n ; n ) converge to the stationary point of the di erential equations (24). Together with the previous lemma, this would imply the assertion of the present one. We shall employ the formulation and results in Benveniste, Metevier and Prioret (1982) . De ne rst the state of the learning process at time T n , denoted by n , which consists of: the number of customers in Q MF at T n ; and for each of these customers as well as the customer that just left, the queue length at her arrival, and her service time in Q MF so far.
We assume that decision rule (19) is in e ect, with a xed > 0. It may then be seen that n and V n determine the statistics of n+1 , so that n has a controlled Markov dynamics. Furthermore, equations (25) may be expressed as V n = V n?1 + 1 n H(V n?1 ; n?1 ; n?1 ) ;
and similarly for n . Fixing V n v (and n ), the sequence n becomes a Markov chain. The times when Q MF empties are renewal times for that sequence, and that the duration of the busy period in Q MF is a.s.-nite with bounded moments, uniformly in v. It then follows that n is recurrent, with a unique stationary distribution. Recall that w (v; x) was de ned as the expected sojourn time, under this distribution, of a customer which enters Q MF at queue size x. Let r(v; x) denote the expected value of I n (x) under this distribution; this is the fraction of customers who enter Q MF at queue size x. Obviously r(v; x) 1; also, because of the uncontrolled arrivals, it may be veri ed that r(v; x) > 0 uniformly in v. Now, the expected value of the perturbation term in (25) becomes r(v;x) (x) (w (v; x) ? v), and for the corresponding term in (26) we obtain (r(v; x) ? (x) ). This identi es (24) as the ODE corresponding to the Stochastic Approximation (25)-(26).
We may now employ Theorem 2.4 (see also Corollary 2.6) in Benveniste, Metevier and Prioret (1982) to deduce the convergence of (V n ; n ) to the stationary point of (22). Indeed, it is easy to verify that (V n ; n ) converge (a.s.) to a bounded set (which follows, e.g., from the above-noted uniform boundedness of the expected buy periods), where the components o bounded away from zero (say, by =2). The required convergence then follows from the the recurrence properties noted above, and the the continuity of the right hand side of the ODE.
Theorem 2 follows from the above lemmas. Indeed, the last lemma and (19) establish the convergence ofû t to u , and the rest follows from Lemma 5.
Simulation Example
We illustrate the learning behavior using a simulated example. This simulation was performed with a constant service rate = 100 and bu er size B = 20 at Q MF , ?1 = 0:1, and Poisson arrivals with rate = 120, of which c = 100 are controlled arrivals and u = 20 are uncontrolled. The Nash equilibrium threshold for these parameters equals g = 11:288. (The latter is easily calculated numerically using the obvious extension of equations (8) to include uncontrolled arrivals.) The randomization interval parameter was chosen as = 0:001, which means that randomized decisions will be implied by the decision rule (18) ?1 , so that as equilibrium is approached, randomized decisions will occur at queue length x = 11. The system was simulated over a time interval of 4000 time units (where each time unit corresponds to approximately 120 external arrivals). The behavior of the average waiting time statisticsV t (x) during the initial 100 time units is depicted in Figure 6 , for entries at the queue lengths x =10, 11 and 12. We can see that fairly large average waiting times were obtained initially. This was caused mainly by the choice of null initial conditions for V t , which encouraged customers to initially join Q PC at all queue sizes. However, once the unfavorable statistics were observed controlled arrival stopped at relatively low queue sizes, and the statistics balanced. Beyond that initial period, reasonable convergence may be observed. The variableV t (10) was the last to leave the band ?1 , around time 130, and beyond that time all arrivals at queue sizes other than x = 11 behaved exactly according to the Nash policy. As to the latter (x = 11), we can see in Figure 7 the value of the randomized decision u t (11) = S ( ?1 ?V t (11)) over the full simulation period. The dashed line denotes the equilibrium value q = 0:288. Good agreement is seen here also. (Observing that around 35000 customers entered the system at this queue size, it may be veri ed that the di erence is well within the stochastic variance of the variables involved.)
Concluding Remarks
The fundamental issue that was considered in this paper is the e ect of projected load buildup on individual user decisions, and consequently on system performance, in shared service facility. Assuming symmetric users, we have shown the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium point, and how this equilibrium emerges as a result of a simple learning scenario.
We conclude by pointing to some issues that deserve further investigation. An important extension of the model would be to the case of multiple user classes (for example, corresponding to di erent service valuations). In this case, users that belong to di erent classes are expected to adopt di erent decision rules, and the question of uniqueness of the equilibrium policy becomes multi-dimensional harder to resolve.
The learning framework suggested here seems quite general, and applicable to other similar models. In the present context, an important extension would be to the case of user-based learning. We have assumed that record keeping (waiting time statistics) is performed by a central entity (the server), which monitors all customers, and makes this information available to all arriving ones. In certain situations it may be more appropriate to consider learning by (a nite number of) users who repeatedly use the same service facility, and each one learns out of its own personal experience. We expect that the convergence analysis contained in this paper could be extended to this case. More complicated distributed learning scenarios which incorporate partial information sharing between users (see, e.g., Kushner and Yin (1987) ) may be similarly considered and analyzed. common probability space, as functions of the same primitive random variables, which enables sample-path comparisons to be made.
Let fT k g k 0 ; fU k g k 0 ; fS`g` 1 ; fU 0`g` 1 denote independent random sequences, with the following statistics and interpretation: fT k g is the sequence of arrival times to the system, as described in section 1. fU k g and fU 0`g are sequences of i.i.d. random variables, uniformly distributed on 0,1]. U k is used for randomized decisions of customer C k , and U 0`d etermines which customer completes her service at time S`. fS`g is the sequence of`potential service completion instants', such that the random variables fS 1 ; S 2 ? S 1 ; S 3 ? S 2 ; : : :g are i.i.d., distributed exponentially with expected value ?1 max .
Using these variables, we de ne the arrival and service processes at Q MF .
Arrivals to Q MF : At T k ; k 0, customer C k arrives at the system, and joins Q MF with some probability p (determined by her decision rule). The actual decision is determined by U k , as follows: C k joins Q MF if U k p, and otherwise joins Q PC .
Service at Q MF : The following description is statistically equivalent to the Processor Sharing service described in Section 1. Denote x`4 = X(S`) and de ne (0) = 0. At time S`, two randomized decisions are taken by the server. First, S`is an actual service completion instant with probability (x`)= max , and a dummy service completion otherwise. In a dummy service completion nothing happens (the queue length is unchanged). In an actual one the server chooses randomly, with equal probability, one of the x`customers in Q MF , which completes her service and leaves the queue. U 0`i s used to implement these randomized decisions, as follows. The x`customers are assigned disjoint intervals in 0; (x`)= max ] 0; 1], each of length (x`)= max (recall that (x) = (x)=x). If U 0`f alls in ( (x`)= max ; 1], then S`is a dummy service completion instant. Otherwise, the customer whose assigned interval contains U 0`i s the one to complete her service.
We choose the interval assignment so that customer C 0 , if present, is always assigned the rst interval. Thus, C 0 leaves the queue at S`if and only if U 0` (x`)= max . The e ect of this assignment is that service completion of C 0 at a given queue size implies the same for a smaller queue size.
For every initial state X(0) = x and policy = fu k g the above description de nes the queue length process fX(t); t 0g and the service time of customer C 0 . In particular, X is a left-continuous, piecewise-constant process, with X(0) = x, and potential jumps given by X(T + k ) = X(T k ) + 1 fU k u k (X(T k ))g ; k 0 (A1) X(S + ) = X(S`) ? 1 fX(S`) > 0; U 0` (X(S`))= max g ;` 1 : (A2) (We shall restrict attention to distinct arrival and service completion instants, which holds with probability 1.) Furthermore, if customer C 0 joins Q MF at T 0 = 0 then her service time is given by: w 0 = S`0;`0 4 = min f` 1 : U 0` (X(S`))= max g :
Proof of Lemma 1: Given policy and state x 1, it is required to prove that V 0 (x + 1; ) ? V 0 (x; ) x > 0.
We consider two processes on the probability space de ned above. The rst (the`x-process') starts at initial state X(0) = x, and the second (the`(x + 1)-process') at x + 1. The variables related to the (x + 1)-process will be denoted by an over-bar, e.g., X(0) = x + 1. In both cases C 0 joins Q MF , and all other customers follow the policy ?0 = (u 1 ; u 2 ; : : :). Let w 0 and w 0 denote the respective service times of C 0 . Relations between random variables are to be interpreted here in a sample-path sense. Let 4 = inf n t 0 : X(t) = X(t) o . Since X(0) > X(0) and the queue length changes by one customer at a time, then X(t) > X(t) for 0 t . Since the decision rule of each customer depends on the current state only, X(t) = X(t) for t > . Thus X(t) X(t) for all t 0, and since (x) = (x)=x is decreasing in x, it follows by (A3) that w 0 w 0 . Thus, V 0 (x + 1; ) ? V 0 (x; ) = E(w 0 ? w 0 ) 0 :
To establish strict inequality (uniformly in ), consider for example the following event: B = fS 1 < T 1 ; U 0 1 2 ( (x + 2)= max ; (x + 1)= max ] g :
On B, in the x-process C 0 will complete her service at time S 1 while in the (x + 1)-process it will have to wait at least until S 2 , so that w 0 ? w 0 S 2 ? S 1 . Thus, E(w 0 ? w 0 ) E(S 2 ? S 1 )1fBg = ?1 max P(B) > 0.
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Proof of Lemma 2:
(i) Let g and g be two thresholds, with g > g. We need to show that V 0 (x; g 1 ) > V 0 (x; g 1 ) for every x. The proof proceeds similarly to that of Lemma 1. The two coupled processes considered here correspond to = g] 1 and = g] 1 respectively, both with initial state x, and C 0 joining Q MF . Since g > g, it is easily seen that X(t) X(t) for all 0 t < 1, which (as in the proof of Lemma 1) implies that w 0 w 0 . Moreover, it is readily veri ed that w 0 > w 0 with positive probability (e.g., by noting that X(S 1 ) > X(S 1 ) with positive probability), so that V 0 (x; g] 1 ) ? V 0 (x; g] 1 ) = E(w 0 ? w 0 ) > 0:
(ii) Fix x, and let g < g be two thresholds with equal integer part L, so that g = L + q and g = L + q with 0 q < q 1. Since, by (i), V 0 (x; g] 1 ) is increasing in g, to establish continuity it is su cient to show that 
In addition, Pfk 0 = k) P fT k w 0 ; q U k qg = (q ? q)P fT k w 0 g :
Thus, we obtain from (A8) that E(w 0 ? w 0 ) (g; g) (q ? q) 1 X k=1 P fT k w 0 g = (g ? g) (g; g)N(g) ; (A11) where N(g) = E P 1 k=1 1 fT k w 0 g is the expected number of arrivals during the sojourn time of C 0 . Finally, (A5) follows by noting that (g; g) and N(g) are bounded by constants which depend only on L; i.e., (g; g) (L + 1; L) and N(g) N(L + 1), which both follow from part (i) of the lemma.
